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ABSTRACT
This study presents the results of the investigation about the current characteristics,
composition and relationship of actors in the ‘Power Structure of Thailand’. The
concept on ‘Power Structure Analysis’ by William Dommhoff is used to construct
the conceptual framework and data analysis. The findings are divided into three (3)
issues. Firstly, characteristics of the power structure and actors can be divided into
three (3) groups, in which all of them have to work together systematically. Sec-
ondly, in terms of composition, these groups can be positioned into three (3) rings
of power structures: the inner, middle and outer rings. And thirdly, these groups
play certain roles according to their relationship. The inner takes responsibility about
creating and planning, the middle takes responsibility about command and con-
trol, and the outer take responsibility about actions. All of them will have to work
together in order to create, use and maintain their power to continuously collect
and protect their interests in the province.
Keywords: decentralization, local government, local power structure, monetary
power complex
INTRODUCTION
This chapter points out the characteristics of local power struc-
ture, how the characteristics affect the building up of power and
wealth of the local power structure’s leaders and their crew, as well
as how the characteristics continually strengthen their power and
wealth. This study focused on a province in the northeastern region
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as a case study. This case study is about the power structure of poli-
tician A, a former member of the provincial parliament who has
been in the position constantly and played an important role in
regional and national politics. He is considered a leading million-
aire of the province, maintaining his wealth from his businesses
throughout the province. Presently, he is no longer a member of
the parliament, but he and his family’s economic status has not
been affected at all. In contrast, he continues to expand his busi-
ness territory. The study adopted the concept of “Power Structure
Analysis” by William G. Dommhoff (2009) and the concept of “mon-
etary power complex” by H.J. Krysmanski (2007). These concepts
concluded that the networking of power structure includes the state
population, relationships or connections, complemented by personal
information, family background, educational institutions, and mem-
bership in organizations. These aspects were used to create the con-
ceptual framework.
This study applied qualitative methods of data collection includ-
ing in-depth interview with the key informant group composed of:
three local politicians; a former member of the provincial parlia-
ment; three provincial administrators; two local administrators; one
NGO representative; one provincial news reporter; and, one citizen
who was worked with the target person. There were twelve infor-
mants altogether. The data analysis was conducted using content
analysis method. All collected data was grouped, analyzed, explained
and presented following the objectives of this study. Finally, all ana-
lyzed data was synthesized for making the formulas and model of
local power structure. The key informant’s real names and last names
are not divulged, but presented only as initials using Thai symbols.
The presentation is organized as follows: (1) the format of politi-
cal network and new benefit groups, (2) the analysis of local power
structure network, and (3) overall conclusion on local power struc-
ture, and proposed guidelines for prevention in order to decrease
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power and wealth centralization in the local power structure.
(1) The Format of Political Network and New Benefit Group
The new political network is not different, that is, it consists of a
party and its leader who plays a role in selecting politicians, who
benefits from the party in several ways including financial or politi-
cal aspects or definite set-up votes. The party leader also decides in
the appointment of ministers and selected persons to various politi-
cal positions. Each selected person for each position has his/her
own network of 7 – 8 politicians and members of the provincial
parliament1in the area as their supporting base. Some may have
more. Each member of provincial parliament has their own form of
networking. For instance, a coordinator in one service area of a
member of provincial parliament may have 2 – 3 crew members.
Moreover, government officers in the province, district, and sub-
district, politicians, community leaders as well as communication
organization networks act as support bases.
In terms of its readiness in organizing the mentioned political
network, participants in this network set-up could easily and legally
take advantage from the annual government statement of expendi-
ture allocated for various projects, especially infrastructure projects.
The mechanism of this mutual benefit management network
through various government projects could be divided into 3 parts.
Part 1 - The party management mechanism: this is the coopera-
tion between the party and its leaders who were appointed to politi-
cal positions in the government. This mechanism had two main
responsibilities: the party or its leaders select potential politicians
or heads of significant groups of parliament members for appoint-
ment to political positions, for example, ministers. Later, the poten-
tial politicians or heads of significant groups of parliament mem-
bers would allocate the ministry’s budget to areas where groups of
the members of parliament are in charge. Within the groups, there
are sub-heads, who are mainly leading candidates of the party in
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each province, taking care of and managing the mutual benefits.
This depended on how much of the budget each parliament mem-
ber could obtain from their sub-heads. In this mechanism, how-
ever, there might be righteous parliament members who exclude
themselves from political elements within the party but have strong
political networks which can be directed to the potential politicians
in order to make an agreement on the mutual benefit. They can
also pull the wires to obtain the budget for their constituency. The
benefit they would get from this mechanism was compensation each
parliament member would receive from the budget they had kept
out for the potential politicians. The sub-heads of the groups must
keep out part of the compensation to send to the appointed politi-
cians, and the appointed politicians would return part of it to the
party in order to be a circulating fund for the party’s national politi-
cal activities.
Part 2 - Mutual benefit management mechanism in electoral dis-
trict: this mechanism is responsible for managing the mutual ben-
efit in the electoral district of politicians in each province. Each
parliament member would manage the benefit within their own
electoral district ranging from allocating projects to the areas, fol-
lowing-up the management of the projects with their areas’ coordi-
nators, tracking down compensations from each project which re-
ceived the direct budget or via provincial budget from contractors,
which normally counted for 10 – 20%, enabling government offic-
ers in all levels to facilitate the smooth and legal implementation of
projects, with the compensation mechanism of approximately 5 –
10% of the total budget to the authorizing government officers start-
ing from the district level to the provincial level. This mechanism
may also involve the transferring of government officers who could
respond to their network in the areas, and promoting those govern-
ment officers to significant positions in their offices. Those who
could not be included in their network are transferred elsewhere.
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This mechanism is used to create popularity for parliament mem-
bers and the party. The parliament members take this opportunity
to follow up the projects co-established with the government and
the public in the area and to generate help to the public with vari-
ous kinds of patronizing, which substantially create popularity for
the parliament members and the party’s leader.
Part 3 - The benefit-compromising mechanism in the area level:
the important actors in this mechanism are the coordinators of the
parliament members in each area and the politicians in the net-
work. Their main responsibility is to hire contractors, to coordinate
and facilitate with all related sections, and to procure according to
the government’s rules and regulations. The allocation of benefit is
among the contractors who were directly hired and the contractors
who took over the work in the area, the politicians, and the govern-
ment officers in the area. The coordinators got the compensation
of 5 – 10% of the total budget from doing such a task, while the
administrators of local administration organizations would receive
approximately 5% share.
However, the benefit that occurred during this mechanism was
not requested to be sent back to the parliament members in order
to be systematically passed on to the party itself. The parliament
members passed on the whole benefit to coordinators of the related
government offices and administrators of communities as a motiva-
tion and loyalty creation for such a task in the future. On the one
hand, this helped the party and the area’s parliament members as a
tool to stabilize and strengthen their base in each area. This was
because such a benefit could “win the hearts” of people in the net-
work and create popularity for themselves and the party. These net-
works played an important role which worked closely with the pub-
lic. They could actually influence how the public think. Thus, the
public, especially those in rural or suburban areas, were literally in-
fluenced by the networks. If the mechanism of this new political
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network could fully seek benefit from the area level network, the
party’s political activities would be smoothly operated and highly
effective. Figure 2 shows the connection of each mechanism men-
tioned above.
THEORETICAL REVIEW
William G. Domhoff (2009) proposes that local power structure
is a set of property owners who see their futures as linked together
because of a common desire to increase the value of their individual
parcels. They come to believe that working together is to the benefit
of each and every one of them. Starting from the level of individual
ownership, a “growth coalition” arises that develops a feeling among
its members even if they differ on other kinds of political and social
issues.
A successful local elite is one that is able to attract the corporate
plants and offices, the defense contracts, the federal and state agen-
cies, and/or the educational and research establishments that lead
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to an expanded work force. An expanded work force and its atten-
dant purchasing power in turn lead to an expansion of commercial
and financial activities.
The hypothesis of local power structure leads to certain expecta-
tions about the relationship between power structures and local
government. The idea that the heart of a local power structure is
provided by those businesses concerned with local real estate values
explains what had been considered a perplexing issue in what was
once called the “community power literature:”
Dommhoff explains that the powerful tool of studying local power
structure is ‘network analysis’ which traces out the people and orga-
nizations that make up the power structure, and then figures out
how they connect to and influence government. Content analysis is
the term for the systematic study of the power structure’s ideolo-
gies, policies, and plans, which are learned about through the care-
ful study of documents such as the texts for speeches, policy state-
ments by organizations, and drafts of legislation.
The methodological approach makes it possible to discover any
concentration or configuration of power. It contains only one as-
sumption: there is a power structure of some kind or another, no
matter how weak or fragmented, in any large-scale society or social
group. The method can discover that power is highly concentrated
or more dispersed, depending on the degree of difference between
rival networks on the power indicators. It can show that some groups
or classes have power in one arena, some in another arena. It can
reveal changes in a power structure over time by changes in the
power indicators. In the United States it usually has led to corpo-
rate power structures at the national level, and landowner/devel-
oper/real estate power structures at the local level, but the results
could be different for other countries and they are sometimes dif-
ferent for cities in the United States.
The empirical study of power begins with a search for connec-
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tions among the people and organizations that are thought to con-
stitute the powerful group or class. This procedure is called ‘mem-
bership network analysis.’ It starts with a study of people and all the
organizations they belong to. Or conversely, you could say the study
starts with a list of organizations that includes all of their members.
The information contained in the matrix is used to create both or-
ganizational and interpersonal networks.
Once the membership networks have been established, there are
many other types of links that might be analyzed, such as kinship
ties or flows of information between organizations. One of the most
important of these other types of links concerns the size and direc-
tion of money flows in the network. In theory, money flows are
another kind of relationship between people or institutions, but in
practice it is a good idea to consider them separately because they
are socially distinct in most people’s minds. And of course they are
usually super important in understanding any modern-day power
structure.
H.J. Krysmanski (2007) proposes that a network composed of
groups and individuals solely defined by monetary wealth will be
prone to various opposing interests, conflicts and contradictions.
On the other hand, the present accumulation processes produce
social and cultural integration effects of their own within those
money elites. Status and class privileges established within the old
system are turning into mere instruments for the accumulation of
money. Corruption has become systemic. These accumulation ac-
tivities have been on a scale that probably indicates a new stage of
capitalism. An unprecedented mass of money capital set itself free
from the commodity form. Accumulation proceeded through finan-
cial deals as never before. And this was supported by the
‘scientification’ and ‘informatisation’ of all aspects of society.
The following operations within the ‘monetary power complex’
can be distinguished by: a) privatization as that type of property
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operation that in the final analysis establishes the money elite as a
new sovereign; b) the established operations of valorisation (capi-
tal) and ‘accumulation by dispossession’ within the capitalist sys-
tem; c) operations of value distribution; and, d) operations of
informatisation which facilitate the operations of privatization,
valorisation and distribution. Privatization in all its forms stabilizes
the ‘monetary power complex’. Turning ‘everything’ into private
property is, on one hand, based on age-old practices of greed
fulfilment. On the other hand, the mechanisms of the knowledge
and information society have increased the range and intensity of
privatization practices to unheard-of levels. Privatization has, in fact,
reduced the extent of privacy for the masses, while enhancing the
privacy of the few. Very few people retain the privilege of self-deter-
mination, i.e. the privilege of privacy. Those few individuals, by defi-
nition, are the superrich.
In contrast, operations of distribution still require parliaments,
governments, laws and the legal system. But this political sphere,
through lobbyism and subventionism, is more and more falling prey
to privatization, too. The contradictions between public and pri-
vate forms of ownership increase and every attempt is made to re-
solve these contradictions in the interest of the ‘monetary power
complex’. A tight net of influence peddling spans the economic
and the political spheres, including systemic corruption. In that sense
the superrich, constituting a class of their own, are ‘capable of ev-
erything’. All possibilities of the knowledge and information soci-
ety are at their disposal and so, by means of the ‘monetary power
complex’.
Krysmansky encircles the core structure and its actors. In this
model, the ring closest to the core (the money elite) would be popu-
lated by the corporate and financial elites, the chief executive offic-
ers of the various industrial and business sectors. These groups func-
tion as the top specialists of capital valorisation, as explorers and
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creators of opportunities for further accumulation.
The next ring houses what might be called the specialists for the
distribution of societal wealth. This is the turf of the political elite.
In the eyes of the ‘monetary power complex’, all parliaments in all
governments have just one function: that is distributing wealth from
the ‘bottom’ to the ‘top’ without endangering the social consensus.
Finally, the vast outer ring is the home of technocrats and experts
indispensable to the functioning of the ‘monetary power complex’.
FINDINGS
This study was investigated through one former national politi-
cian of the northeastern region (Politician A), who turned his inter-
est to local politics within the province. He took advantage of his
relationship with another local politician, and set this local politi-
cian as his coordinator working with chief executives of other sub-
district administration organizations within his former base area.
This was to be the base for each year’s annual budget balance which
was allocated to him from other national-level politicians with whom
he had close relationship. For instance, there was an annual 30
million baht allocated to several sub-district administration organi-
zations in the network. Each sub-district administration organiza-
tion must propose to the chief executives, who were also heads of
the networks, projects which emphasize on developing infrastruc-
tures. The heads would gather all proposals and process them
through all governmental procedures. In this stage, some govern-
ment officers in all levels facilitated the process. Once the projects
were all gathered, they would be sent to parliament members in the
central parliament and be given allocation according to their re-
quested budgets.
Mostly, the central parliament members set aside 10% from the
annual budget as commission. The rest of the money would be passed
down to the network of Politician A, which will point out who would
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be the contractor for the project. Once Politician A was informed of
the approval of each project, including the contractors for them, he
would inform the chief executives of sub-district administration or-
ganizations, or the heads of the networks, in order to pass this news
to the sub-district administration organization which took posses-
sion of such projects. Then they would rightly procure according to
the government’s rules. During this stage, Politician A and the heads
of the networks would set aside 5 – 10% as commission from each
project or according to prior agreement or negotiation by the chief
executives of the area. In some cases, the project was simply oper-
ated without any high technology and complicated operation but
gave high return (around 15 – 20%). The chief executives would
play role in operating such a project themselves. If the contractors
in the networks were the initiators of such a project from the begin-
ning, they would take the job but need to pay the chief executives as
usual.
This process clearly shows the local power structure, and the ability
to seek and collect wealth by Politician A both during his duty and
after his duty as the parliament member. This is the operation in a
form of networking which included national-level politicians, pro-
vincial agents who had close relationship with the national-level
politicians, the networking contractors, heads of the local politi-
cians, and district and provincial government officers. Under this
network, there was a unity and there were several of such networks.
It was very difficult for any sub-district administration organizations
of any sections outside such networks to be adopted. For example,
they would have no right to receive budget sent from national-level
politicians no matter how good their proposed projects would be
for communities. When they were not involved in such networks,
these fruitful projects would be terminated. One informant stated
that:
“If the project is from the province of …which is not the one in the
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network of one of the national-level politicians, every single project will
be terminated for many reasons. On the other hand, projects from the
province where the politician is in charge will be allocated full budget
since he can completely control all the procure procedures or the govern-
ment auction, or they call it in their hands.”2
Another informant also mentioned the influence of such a net-
work, in agreement with the previous one, as follows:
“In fact, all communities are informed to have the right to propose their
own projects in order to ask for budget. But if they are not in the net-
work, the projects will be dropped out. They are impossible. “3
An important thing that maintains this network together was
that the national-level politicians received benefit from all projects’
budgets. Moreover, they could also create their votive bases from
areas in the network. As for the heads of the networks and the local
politicians within the networks, they would receive additional ben-
efit from external budget which many national-level politicians allo-
cate to them as a return. This was the main income that strongly
supported their wealth. This amount of money was much more
than the benefit from the local government organizations, where
there was already plenty. Moreover, the local politicians could take
advantages from the projects as the demonstration for the next pe-
riod of election campaign.
Due to the benefit arising from the budget administration of the
local administration organizations as well as both national and re-
gional level politics’ increasingly strong competition, the national-
level politics tended to have more influence on results of local elec-
tions. The local politicians who received funds from higher-level
politicians and the national-level politicians in the area all won the
election. That is, any community administrators who agree to join
the patronizing networks of the national-level politicians could win
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any elections. On the contrary, those who did not agree to join the
patronizing networks have very little chance of winning any elec-
tions. This is because the national-level politicians would interfere
by nominating their people to be competitive candidates in the elec-
tions. Moreover, they would set up a huge amount of funding in
order to buy votes, hoping to win the election and have their people
on board the authority of the local administration organization.
Previous elections showed how successful this strategy turned out,
that is, almost 100 per cent of chief executives of sub-district admin-
istration organizations from several areas agreed to join the networks
in which the national-level politicians had their influence. Figure 3
demonstrates the relationship of the network of local influential
people with the ways the networks seek benefit.
FIGURE 3: RELATIONSHIP OF THE NETWORK OF LOCAL INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE WITH WAYS THE NETWORKS SEEK BENEFIT
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DISCUSSION: THE ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL POWER
STRUCTURE NETWORK
This part analyzes and points out the development of the power
structure, people’s networks, and organizations under the networks,
as well as relationship within the power structure networks. This is
to show how the local power structure network works in order to
help politician A and his networks in the power structure maintain
the influential person in the province and help them use such struc-
ture create mutual economic benefit.
This part of analysis demonstrates several levels of relationship
in the form of three circles including the inner circle, the middle
circle, and the outer circle. The inner circle shows the networks’
members that had very close relationship with politician A, for ex-
ample, family, relatives, and friends. The middle circle shows the
political networks and the provincial and national business networks.
The outer circle shows the crew networks, acquaintances, and people
in the province. These are shown in figure 4.
FIGURE 4: POLITICIAN A’S LOCAL POWER STRUCTURE
Adapted from H.J. Krismanski, 2007
The researcher divided the analysis into 3 parts as follows:
(1) The inner circle within the local power structure
This circle mainly includes family business networks which con-
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nect with other businessmen. All these groups of people have differ-
ent activities to support Politician A as follows:
The family business networks set up the networks of business-
men, politicians, and both provincial and national government of-
ficers who needed to be involved due to business. Moreover, they
have a fortune of benefit with several groups of people from both
government section and private section. With these mentioned
networks, they are able to access and request for support from all
the people they are connected with on business matters or govern-
ment matters4. They also take advantage of making merit by donat-
ing a lot of money in order to access and receive support from the
religious side. They also take advantage of relationships they had
built with other groups or organizations, for instance, civil boy scouts,
Rotary-Lions, Chamber of Commerce, foundations, etc. From the
existing tightened and deepened economic networks they had, they
supported them financially and materially as a result of the patron-
izing relationship with “funds” as a significant factor.
The provincial businessmen networks have a much tightened
relationship with Politician A’s family business networks since they
deal with business and worked socially and continually together.
This gathering of the provincial businessmen networks into the
power structure resulted significantly in the power structure’s greater
strength.
(2) The middle circle within the local power structure
When considering Politician A’s power structure, it could be said
that the structure was very sophisticated. That is, the structure de-
pended on the decentralizing mechanism to local administration
organizations in the province and personal relationships with na-
tional-level politicians, government officers, the provincial business-
men, as well as the politicians in the area as shown in the middle
circle in Figure 4.
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The national-level politicians: The relationships between Politician
A and leaders of national-level politicians resulted in pulling politi-
cal and governmental strings to access the annual government state-
ment of expenditure involving infrastructure development, and to
set aside some of the budget, for example, the budget for road con-
struction and other infrastructures, for their provinces. This actu-
ally benefited the public, and moreover, this was considered an ad-
vantage for them to create popularity among the public by taking
credits for all constructions. Politician A could take all credits in
order to strongly build his voting bases among people in the prov-
ince, especially in his electoral district.
The teaching and academic government officers: Besides seeking na-
tional-level political alliance into his networks, Politician A also ex-
tended the networks in the regional level. One important factor
enabling his provincial political success was his ability to persuade
the teaching and academic officers to vote for him in his electoral
district. He did it by becoming one of the provincial primary educa-
tional committee members, which held authority in appointing and
hiring teaching and academic officers working in the province’s pri-
mary schools. Therefore, his coordination with the network in per-
suading the teaching and academic officers into the networks was
not very difficult. He started this by approaching leading teachers
in the area first, and proposed all kinds of assistance, for instance,
helping them with all errands, assisting them in appointing or trans-
ferring the teaching and academic officers as requests, and pushing
for the teaching and academic officers’ promotions annually.
The local politician networks: This type of network was built through
the patronizing relationship securing political and economic ben-
efit for both sides. That is, Politician A totally supported the local
politicians with finance and materials for election campaigns. Once
the local politicians won elections and were appointed to positions,
they must pay back Politician A for his prior assistance by being a
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channel in which Politician A can seek benefit. This was by being in
the offices that receives the allocated budget for governmental con-
struction and infrastructure projects and by coordinating with local
and regional government officers and in facilitating the mentioned
mission.
(3) The outer circle in the local power structure
People in the outer circle remotely supported the existence of
authority and benefit of the local power structure, including monks,
agriculturists, and general people. The main responsibility of this
group of people was to be his voting base during elections. Politi-
cian A must pay attention to convincing this group of people to
cooperate with him.
The development of the local power structure in the people’s side
At the beginning, Politician A rarely had his political base di-
rectly from people. His mass base was initially set up from his ac-
quaintances. After that, he gradually tried to play his role in build-
ing up his own voting base among the people in the sub-district
level. His ways to build the voting base could be divided into 3 ways,
including building the voting base through local politicians, through
teachers’ organizations, and through agriculturists’ groups.
The establishment of people’s networks through politicians and commu-
nities’ leaders: It was shown that Politician A used the local election
system as a tool to build his mass base through supporting candi-
dates in municipal level and sub-district administration organiza-
tions or heads of villages with funds and other resources for cam-
paigning, for example, advertising trucks and flyers. This was with
the hope that the local politicians winning the elections would be
able to convince their people to be his base later, aside from being
in his business networks. This was due to more closeness between
the local politicians and the people, than he with them. Having the
local politicians under his power structure brought him closer to
people in the area. Therefore, he would have a better chance to
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create the patronizing system with the people who rely on the local
politicians or communities’ leaders, who will then be the media
that would connect him to the area people’s needs. Then, Politician
A would provide the local politicians or the communities’ leaders
with resources as requested by the people. For example, in case of a
people’s request for road repairs or road construction, he could
manage to use the local politicians or communities leaders’ mecha-
nism in pulling out central budget to the local administration orga-
nization. If it was a case of a people’s request for the same matter
through the heads of villages, he might directly and immediately
use his relatives’ companies or those of his networks to address the
request immediately. This way, Politician A could build up more of
his people network to support him.
The establishment of people’s network through teacher organizations: It
is well-known that the teacher network organization is one very strong
influence to people’s ways of life. Thus, anyone being able to take
the teachers into their side would be easily accepted and respected.
As mentioned earlier, Politician A and his brother had well put in
place the teacher organization as their political base. They relied on
their being alumni of a university and their degrees in education to
have access to the teacher organization’s leaders. His brother was a
member of the primary educational committee which held author-
ity in appointing and hiring teaching and academic officers work-
ing in the province’s primary schools, and that was one strong fac-
tor persuading the teacher organization’s leaders and other teach-
ing government officers to gladly agree to work with him. There-
fore, the teaching and academic government officer organization
became one network being used to build the voting base among
people in the area. Especially during election time, the role of the
teacher and academic government officer organization in connect-
ing politicians and people was very significant.
The establishment of people’s network through agriculturists’ organiza-
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tion: There was an attempt to build up a relationship with the rub-
ber tree growers’ organization of a province by supporting the orga-
nization of cultivated baby rubber trees. To do so meant the pulling
of the rubber tree grower organization into the business, and allow-
ing them to use materials and equipment in production, for ex-
ample, cultivated baby rubber trees, fertilizers, and pesticides. This
was in exchange for an agreement that the growers would send the
product in the form of rubber milk and other transformed prod-
ucts to his company. Politician A support of the rubber tree grower
organization in his province, which was expanding rapidly, was one
strategy of drawing another group of people into the local power
structure in economic and political perspectives. The benefits that
he gets from this: his business could continually grow, and his po-
litical base was also expanded.
In conclusion, for the local power structure to be completely
working, the three circles’ performance altogether is needed. That
is, the inner circle must bring resources and the public in the middle
circle and the outer circle to synthesize with other existing capitals,
and turn those into a drive or motivation for Politician A to politi-
cally compete in order to seek and maintain his political power.
Meanwhile, Politician A needed to keep all networks in the three
circles as long as possible or to extend all the networks in the three
circles as much as possible. This depended on his ability in putting
the local power structure into good use for himself and his mem-
bers in all the networks of the three circles. If this was not success-
ful, his power structure may become relatively unstable.
Even though he had no longer been in any political positions, he
maintained his relationship with some of the networks in the in-
ner, middle, and outer circles. It could be said that he could con-
tinue his and his networks’ power, influence, and wealth. It is shown
that through people’s acceptance and respect towards him, he re-
mains as one influential political and business figure of the prov-
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ince despite his lack of chance to enter real political power for quite
a period of time.
The synthesis of this study reveals the power structure and pro-
cedures in using it to seek economic and political benefit of Politi-
cian A, who was the leader of this local power structure, in a form
of equation showing relationship between previously proposed varia-
tions as follows:
The equation showing relationship between the variations en-
abling the local power structure
The local power structure = (family business + social networks +
business networks + local and regional government officer networks
+ local and national politician networks) – (public’s benefit + trend
of national political parties)
From the equation, it could be concluded that in the context of
the studied province, anyone desiring to establish their own local
power structure depended on the sum of their own and their family
business capability, the extent of their social networks, business,
local and regional government officer, and local and national politi-
cian networks. Meanwhile, how sustainable such power structure
could stand depended on how much it affected the public’s benefit
and how strong the trend of the national political parties in the area
is5. That is, if the power structure did not create any problems or
adversely affect the area public’s ways of life, but smoothly built up
mutual benefit relationship with the area people, it could firmly
stand. On the other hand, if the power structure could not create
such mutual relationship with the area people, or operated in a way
that might drastically affect the public’s benefit, such power struc-
ture could possibly decline. Another factor important to the exist-
ence of the local power structure is popularity towards the national
political parties in the area. This would affect the leaders’ status as
the influential or powerful figure in the society since the area people
could turn their interest to political parties that better answered
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their needs. This would make their status as the influential and
powerful figure and political power unstable, and there are risks in
the decline of the local power structure and being replaced with a
new power structure supported by more popular political parties.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the local power structure investigated in this study
was called “money politics.” It arose from a combination of eco-
nomic and political benefits of networks’ leaders and people in such
networks including businessmen, politicians, government officers,
and groups of people in the area. The study showed that any gather-
ings in such power structure are very tight as long as all parties in
the networks or gatherings receive satisfactory benefits. This kind
of gatherings resulted in centralizing power and wealth in the area,
which were centralized in the group of the local power structure
leaders, especially people in the inner and middle circles as men-
tioned earlier. The result of this circumstance was the extending
inequality in economy in the area of study. Meanwhile, power and
other political spheres of people outside the networks were narrowed
down. They could not get access to essential resources for their liv-
ing unlike others in the networks. This also led to them being forced
to enter any of the local power structures in order for them to have
equal economic and political power and opportunities like others
in the society. In the sample case of the rubber tree project, it was a
rush in the extent of power and wealth centralization. If such cir-
cumstance occurred without any preventions or solutions, this might
lead to several economic, social, and political problems in the area
as happened in the national politics.6
Therefore, in order to prevent and solve the power and wealth
centralizing problem within the local power structure as mentioned,
the researcher would like to propose a guideline of prevention and
solution as follows7.
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(1)A review of the power decentralization: There needs to be “the
horizontal decentralization” from government offices to commu-
nities instead of the former “vertical decentralization.” This is
because the former decentralization was one factor increasing
the power and wealth centralization problem at present. There
should be a new power allocation between locality, communi-
ties, and people by decreasing role of the local administration
organizations which is a representative for all people and encour-
aging the people to take direct roles in local administration as
much as possible8.
(2)An encouragement of direct democracy along with representa-
tive democracy in the community: This is to encourage the people
and communities to balance any decisions of the local adminis-
tration organizations. The local administration organizations must
consult, listen to, and seek facts with the people in the commu-
nities which will be affected by the local administration organiza-
tions’ operation. It depends on the principle that the balance of
representative democracy must come from the power of direct
democracy, that is, it is through people’s consultation, and nego-
tiation between the people and communities and the local ad-
ministration organizations9.
(3)Strengthening the community and people: There are two ways
to strengthen the community and people. The first way is the
allocation of budget directly to the people, which would fully
empower them in making decisions on some aspects due to their
actual needs or could make decisions on who would operate their
projects without any monopoly of government offices. The sec-
ond way is that the academic units in the area encourage the
people’s strengthening. This is by motivating and supporting
mutual knowledge management among people in the same com-
munity and cross communities in order to exchange knowledge.
It would lead to the increase of experience in self-management
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of the community and people as well as increasing their verifying
and balancing ability with the area’s governmental system10.
One reason the researcher proposed the abovementioned three
suggestions is that the governmental system in the central, regional,
and local levels is the one important factor supporting the local
power structure. From the study, it can be show that this power
structure relied on the power of the area’s and central governmen-
tal system in developing and steadily maintaining its status in the
community. Thus, this study would like to suggest the decrease of
the governmental system’s power by encouraging the community
and people to be strengthened and to be able to increase their self-
management. This could result in such a way that the local power
structure could no longer rely on the governmental system’s power
in seeking, or preventing economic benefit as usual. It is because
most of the power that used to be with the governmental system
would be transferred to the community, and the people would have
power to make decisions and to directly manage their own locality
as well as to have power to verify and balance the governmental
system’s power in the area11. If the decentralization to the people
and the self-management of the community as proposed would be
successful, it would be the good prevention and solution to the prob-
lem of local power and wealth centralization, which results from the
extent of the local power structure in the area.
ENDNOTES
1 This is also known as “Mung” in Thai, referring to a group of people sharing
benefits and political power within the group. Everyone in the group must
work together in order to acquire both personal and group interests. It is a kind
of informal group and there are no regulations. That means anyone who is
willing can join the group. And every group always has its leader having power
to collect benefits in the name of the group and share those to everyone in the
group. So, the leader must be obeyed by the members of the group. If someone
does something which is out of order and beyond the control of the leader, he/
she must leave the group or may compulsorily be expelled.
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2 From interview
3 From interview
4 Nielsen. Richard P..(2003). Corruption Networks and Implications for Ethical
Corruption Reform. Journal of Business Ethics. January.
5 Enderwick, Peter. (2005). What’s Bad About Crony Capitalism?. Asian Business
& Management. Volume 4. Number 2. 1. June.
6 See National Reform Council, The Proposal of Power Structure Reform, 3rd ed.
Bangkok: TQP CO, LTD. 2011. p. 7 - 11
7 All three proposals were adapted from the Proposal of Power Structure Reform
of the National Reform Council. Referred to in footnote 13. p. 32 – 40.
8 Bardhan, Pranab. (2002). Decentralization of Governance and Development.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 16. No. 4.
9 Matsusaka, John G. (20050. Direct Democracy Works. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives. Vol. 19. No. 2.
10 Gaventa, John and Camilo Valderrama. (1999), Participation, Citizenship and
Local Governance. Background note prepared for workshop on Strengthening
participation in local governance. Institute of Development Studies, June 21-
24.
11 Bucek, Jan and Brian Smith. (20000). New approaches to local democracy: di-
rect democracy, participation and the ‘third sector’. Environment and Planning
C: Government and Policy. volume 18.
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ABSTRACT
The linkage between democracy and citizen happiness in developing countries is
rarely examined. This study examines the link between democracy and citizen hap-
piness in Indonesia, a new emerging democratic country in South East Asia. Data
comes from the Indonesian Family Life Survey 2007 (Nindividual = 29.055; Nhousehold =
12.528; Ndistrict = 262) and the Indonesian Family Survey East 2012 (Nindividual =
5.910; Nhousehold = 2.546; Ndistrict = 55). Results from a three-level ordinary logit
model show that democracy as measured by age of direct local democracy is not
associated with citizen happiness. Instead of age of direct local democracy, district
community social capital and spending public services give benefit for citizen hap-
piness. The results are robust against individual and district characteristics related
to happiness. The results highlight the importance of promoting community social
capital and improving district capacity in delivering public service to improve citizen
happiness in Indonesia.
Keywords: democracy, happiness, three-level ordinary logit model, Indonesia
INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, citizen happiness has become an
important development agenda in Western countries, particularly
rich countries across Europe and North America (Argyle 2001;
OECD 2013). The economic crisis in Europe and United States at
the end of 2009 have realised that economic welfare or GDP is not
the only ultimate goal of development. The government and lead-
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